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Jean-Pierre Benoitt and Lewis A. Kornhausertt
State parties to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees have an obligation not to return refugees to the countries
they have fled.' Under the Protocol, a "refugee" is any person who
is unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality or
former habitual residence "owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion."' 2 Other individuals
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Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 31, 1967, 19 UST 6223, 6225, TIAS
No 6577 ("1967 Protocol"), incorporating by reference Article 33 of the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Jul 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150, 176 ("1951 Convention"), reprinted
as an appendix to the 1967 Protocol, 19 UST at 6276. ("No Contracting State shall expel or
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion.").
2 1967 Protocol, Art I, 19 UST at 6225 (cited in note 1), incorporating by reference (and
without the time qualification) the definition of "refugee" in Article 1, T A(2) of the 1951
Convention:
[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who.... owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
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seeking admittance to a country have no such right not to be re-
turned. United States immigration law makes th6 same distinction,
adopting the Protocol's definition of refugee.3
Since the mid-seventies, the flow of emigrants4 from Cambo-
dia, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Somalia, Vietnam, and
other countries has tested the force and meaning of this obligation.
In these cases, large numbers of individuals have fled countries
that are both economically poor and politically repressive. In each
case, some recipient countries have repatriated large numbers of
these emigrants, arguing that they were economic and not political
refugees. In addition, both the Hong Kong and the United States
governments have argued that a less stern approach encourages ec-
onomic refugees to undertake journeys across dangerous seas in
unsafe boats.'
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
1951 Convention, 189 UNTS at 152, reprinted as an appendix to the 1967 Protocol, 19 UST
at 6261.
3 See 8 USC § 1101(a)(42) (1988) (definition of "refugee"); 8 USC § 1158(a) (1988)
(only refugees may be granted "asylum"). See also INS v Stevic, 476 US 407, 428 n 22
(1983) ("Our [statutory] definition of a 'refugee' ... virtually mirrored the Protocol defini-
tion."). Aliens seeking political asylum may qualify for two different immigration statuses: If
they are outside the United States they may request "refugee" status. 8 USC § 1101(a)(42).
If they are within the United States or seeking entry they may request "asylum" status. 8
USC § 1158(a). In addition, if they are within or seeking entry to the United States and
cannot meet the criteria for asylum, they make seek a "withholding of deportation" status. 8
USC § 1253(h) (1988). Finally, the Attorney General, under appropriate circumstances, may
grant "temporary protective" status to a particular nationality. 8 USC § 1254a(a) (Supp
1990). The criteria for eligibility and award of these statuses differ, as do the procedural and
substantive burdens and the benefits of the status. The structure of U.S. law is discussed
more fully in Section II.A.
I Terminology in the context of immigration policy is treacherous. In ordinary language
the term "refugee" is often used as a generic reference for someone who has fled his country.
As the earlier footnotes indicate, however, "refugee" also has a technical, legal meaning. In
what follows we try to adhere to the following conventions: "Refugee," unmodified by an
adjective, is used in its legal sense. "Economic refugee" refers to someone who has fled his
country for economic reasons (and hence does not qualify as a refugee in the legal sense).
"Political refugee" is synonymous with "refugee" in the legal sense.
We also use "alien" as a generic term. Moreover, "emigrants" is used generically to
describe economic and political refugees from the perspective of the country they have fled;
"immigrants" describes the same individuals from the perspective of the country to which
they have fled. Usually, "immigrants" is not used in any technical, legal sense.
5 US Response to the Recent Haitian Exodus, Statement of Robert Gelbard (Depart-
ment of State) before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees
of the House Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 20, 1991), in Dept of State
Dispatch 864 (Nov 25, 1991), available on LEXIS (EXEC library, DSTATE file) ("Gelbard
Statement"). See also Clayton Jones, Turning Back Economic Migrants, Christian Sci Mon
4 (June 22, 1989).
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The legal debates over these repatriations and the appropriate
state policies toward the flow of emigrants have focused on the
process for assessing claims of persecution, on the nature of "vol-
untary" repatriation programs implemented by recipient countries,
and on the extent of oppression in the countries from which the
emigrants fled.' These debates, however, have neglected the inter-
dependent effects that the quality of screening of immigrants and
the repatriation policy have on the flow of emigrants.
In this Article, we argue that an understanding of these effects
is crucial to an evaluation of state policies.7 Part I sets out the
theoretical argument. In particular, we demonstrate that a restric-
tive immigration policy that inadequately distinguishes political
from economic refugees may disproportionately discourage those
with a well-founded fear of persecution from flight. A failure to
recognize this effect may lead to a misevaluation of state policy.
Part II analyzes recent U.S. policy toward Haitians. We pre-
sent evidence concerning the extent of political persecution in Ha-
iti and the quality of screening procedures used by the United
States. This evidence bears on the evaluation of U.S. policy not
only directly but also indirectly through the effect described in
Part I. Readers averse to formal argument may prefer to read Part
II first.
I. A SIMPLE MODEL OF EMIGRATION DECISIONS
A. An Outline of the Argument
Consider some country A whose citizens suffer both economic
hardship and political oppression. Some citizens of A (call them
"aliens") decide to leave in the hope of settling in country T, which
offers better economic conditions and more personal security. We
wish to understand how restrictive immigration policies of T affect
the decisions of aliens to leave A.
6 See generally Haitian Refugee Center v Civiletti, 503 F Supp 442 (S D Fla 1980),
modified sub nom, Haitian Refugee Center v Smith, 676 F2d 1023 (5th Cir 1982); Haitian
Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir 1992), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1245 (1992);
Haitian Centers Council v McNary, 969 F2d 1350 (2d Cir 1992), cert granted, 61 USLW
3156, 1992 US App LEXIS 17372; Claire P. Gutekunst, Interdiction of Haitian Migrants on
the High Seas: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 Yale J Intl L 151 (1984); Note, Interdiction:
The United States' Continuing Violation of International Law, 68 BU L Rev 773 (1988).
7 Throughout this Article, we consider either a hypothetical country T or an actual
country (the United States) with a restrictive immigration policy. We do so to clarify the
issues raised above. The argument that follows does not imply an endorsement of these
restrictive immigration policies or of the repressive policies of the country fled.
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An immigration policy for T has two parts. First, it articulates
criteria that classify aliens into acceptable and unacceptable immi-
grants. Second, it establishes screening procedures to sort individ-
ual aliens into these two classes.
Suppose that country T adopts a "closed door" policy that
basically excludes immigration.8 T, however, is a party to the 1967
Protocol and therefore admits aliens with a well-founded fear of
persecution.9 Thus, domestic law and policy in T identify two clas-
ses of aliens seeking to enter: "economic refugees" (whose claims to
asylum are denied) and "political refugees" (who meet the 1967
Protocol's definition and whose claims are granted).
Consider now T's screening process. Suppose a population of
aliens awaits screening. Some will be permitted to stay in country
T and others will be forcibly repatriated. 10 The screening proce-
dure may fail in two distinct ways. First, T may refuse entry to a
person with a legitimate claim to asylum; call this failure a "wrong-
ful denial of asylum." Second, T may permit a person without a
legitimate claim to stay; call this procedural failure an "erroneous
8 Our argument does not require that country T ban all immigration of non-political
aliens; we make this assumption for expositional convenience. In Section II.A., we suggest
that U.S. policy as applied to Haitian nationals approximates the closed-door policy as-
sumed in this Section. See text accompanying note 84.
1 The law of the United States governing establishment of a claim of a "well-founded
fear of persecution" is extremely complex. Various procedural and evidentiary questions
were resolved in INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421 (1987), and INS v Stevic, 467 US 407
(1984), but the substantive law itself remains complex for several reasons. First, as discussed
at greater length in Section II, an alien may seek either withholding of deportation or asy-
lum status (if he is within the United States) or refugee status (if he is outside it). See text
accompanying notes 63-66.
Second, practice in the Board of Immigration Appeals, the administrative court han-
dling asylum claims, may not always strictly adhere to the judicially articulated criteria.
Deborah E. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States: A Guide to Administrative
Practice and Case Law 116 (AILF, 2d ed 1991).
Third, to prevail on an asylum claim, the applicant must establish not only that she has
a well-founded fear of persecution but also that (a) she is a target of persecution and (b)
that she is a target "on account of' her membership in one of the statutorily listed groups.
Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook 149 (AILF, 2d ed 1991) (collecting
cases); Sanchez-Trujillo v INS, 801 F2d 1571, 1574-76 (9th Cir 1986).
"[Plersecution includes more than just restrictions on life and liberty," Cardoza-Fon-
seca v INS, 767 F2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir 1985), aft'd, 480 US 421 (1987); it encompasses
other forms of punishment or reprisal, including at times an impairment of the ability to
earn a living, Desir v llchert, 840 F2d 723, 727 (9th Cir 1988), due to beliefs or characteris-
tics that the government finds intolerable, Hernandez-Ortiz v INS 777 F2d 509, 516-17 (9th
Cir 1985).
10 In some instances, as with respect to Cubans who left Mariel in 1980, forcible repa-
triation might be impossible because the "home" country will not accept its own nationals.
Under these circumstances, country T might attempt either to deport the aliens to some
other country that will accept them or to intern them.
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grant of asylum." One goal of T's policy, then, is to minimize the
likelihood of both these types of error or, when both errors cannot
be minimized simultaneously, to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween them.
Many procedures in a wide variety of contexts present oppor-
tunities for similar types of error. In statistics, "wrongful denials"
are usually characterized as "false negatives," while "erroneous ad-
missions" are characterized as "false positives."11 Ideally, one
would like to minimize both errors, but an inherent tension be-
tween them generally forces one to reduce one error at the cost of
increasing the other. For instance, in a different context, a fire
alarm can malfunction by not ringing when there is a fire (a false
negative) or ringing when there is no fire (a false positive). If the
alarm is very sensitive to temperature changes or the presence of
particulates in the air, it will detect almost all fires (i.e., have few
false negatives); but it will also often ring when there is no threat
of fire (i.e., have many false positives). As the alarm's sensitivity to
temperature or particulates declines, the number of false positives
declines, but the number of false negatives unfortunately rises.12
This conflict appears in the emigration context as well. If the
entire group of aliens is allowed into the country, then the first
error is eliminated altogether-no legitimate refugees are de-
ported-but the second error is at its highest-all the aliens with-
out legitimate claims are accepted into the country. On the other
hand, if the entire group is rejected, the first error is maxi-
mized-all the refugees with legitimate claims are rejected-but
the second error is minimized-no aliens without legitimate claims
are accepted. As we shall see, however, the present context raises
an additional subtlety that is absent from the statistician's usual
case.
The above discussion has assumed a given population of aliens
seeking admission. However, the screening process may also influ-
ence the number and kind of aliens who seek admission. Conscien-
'" Statisticians call false negatives "type I errors," while naming false positives "type II
errors."
" Some changes, however, reduce both types of error. A sophisticated fire alarm with a
computer chip may register fewer false alarms and miss fewer real fires than a more rudi-
mentary device.
Another example further illustrates the two types of error: Various commentators have
noted that the burden of proof and other procedural devices in criminal cases affect the
probability of wrongful conviction. Criminal procedure attempts to minimize the number of
wrongful convictions at the cost of increasing the number of erroneous acquittals. Proce-
dural requirements in civil cases strike this balance differently.
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tious adherence to the 1967 Protocol suggests that country T, with
its general policy against immigration, would seek to minimize the
number of aliens seeking admission who have no legitimate fear of
persecution, while simultaneously not discouraging anyone with a
real fear of political persecution from seeking refuge. Thus, this
second purpose (directed at the composition of the flow of immi-
grants) operates before the arrival of immigrants in country T
while the first purpose (directed at reducing screening errors in a
given population) operates only after a population of refugees has
arrived.
Suppose that country T simply repatriates to country A those
aliens that it finds inadmissible. Repatriation occurs through "reg-
ular" channels, which require notification to country A of the repa-
triation. We shall assume that country A supervises, either directly
or indirectly, the repatriation process. This supervision means that
country A also "screens" the repatriated aliens. That is, country A
monitors the repatriated aliens to see if they include any "state
enemies." Thus, upon repatriation, country A may identify indi-
viduals with a well-founded fear of persecution.13
For purposes of analysis, one can assign two numbers each to
country T's repatriation (or deportation and exclusion) policy and
country A's policy toward repatriated citizens. For country T,
these numbers are (1) the likelihood that an alien without a well-
founded fear of persecution will be repatriated and (2) the likeli-
hood that an alien with a well-founded fear of persecution will be
repatriated. 14 Since country A does not publish lists of its political
targets, T cannot easily determine which refugees do indeed have a
well-founded fear of persecution. Thus, we can expect both these
numbers to be positive. Their exact magnitudes depend upon the
13 The screening process adopted by country A may also make both types of error. It
may wrongly identify some "innocent" repatriated aliens (true economic refugees) as state
enemies subject to persecution, and it may fail to identify some repatriated aliens who had
attempted to flee government persecution.
" At times, other features of T's and A's policies may be relevant. For example, the
duration of the screening process may be important to an alien. Consider an individual who
fears persecution in A but believes that the regime she fears will be deposed in six months.
If the screening will last at least six months, she may be reasonably indifferent to the qual-
ity of the screening. In this case, a reinterpretation of the probability of repatriation in our
model as the probability of repatriation within six months might be adequate for analytic
purposes. We ignore these complications in the text.
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care taken during the screening process and T's overall propensity
to repatriate refugees.15
The two numbers that characterize A's policy toward repatri-
ated citizens are (1) the probability that a political refugee will be
persecuted upon his return and (2) the probability that an eco-
nomic refugee will be persecuted. With regard to the first number,
the probability that a political refugee will be persecuted once re-
patriated most likely exceeds the probability that this person
would have been persecuted had he never left A, but had instead
taken other preventive steps. After all, from A's point of view, it
makes sense to exploit the fact that T has handed over a person A
had previously sought. Still, persecution is not certain since A may
fail to identify the political refugee upon his return.1"
At the same time, officials of A might mistakenly conclude
that a person who fled for economic reasons had a political motive
for leaving. Thus, a person who originally had little reason to fear
persecution might suddenly find himself a target upon his repatria-
tion. Though possible, we will assume for the most part that A is
competent in identifying its "enemies," so that a non-political ref-
ugee faces little chance of persecution when repatriated."
A person deciding whether or not to leave country A and seek
refuge in T balances the benefits and costs of such a decision. The
benefits may include such things as freedom from political perse-
cution and an improved economic position, while the costs may in-
clude such things as the risk of death that the voyage itself may
15 As we shall see in Section II.B.4, at least in the case of Haitian refugees coming to
the United States, evidence shows that both these likelihoods are quite high and similar in
magnitude.
16 Even if country A does make a correct identification, it may, for various reasons,
choose not to persecute this person immediately upon his arrival. For example, country T or
human rights organizations may be monitoring the returns, and this monitoring is likely to
be most intensive at the points of return. Such a delay may cause A to lose track of the
person, so that again, persecution is not a certainty.
An additional consideration also suggests that the probability of persecution may be
higher for a repatriated refugee. A person might legitimately flee country A out of a fear
that his past activities will lead to future persecution, although the government of A is as
yet unaware of these activities. The government may discover these activities after the indi-
vidual's departure or (because the government of A is likely to examine repatriated refugees
more closely than those people who never leave) this person's activities may be discovered
upon his return.
17 Country A might also choose to punish people simply for the attempt to leave. Al-
though such a policy may characterize some countries (such as the former eastern bloc coun-
tries), it does not characterize all countries. In Section II.B.4, we evaluate evidence concern-
ing Haiti on this question.
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entail, the trauma experienced when leaving one's family, friends,
language, and culture, and the monetary cost of the voyage."8
Consider what happens as country T reduces the percentage of
aliens it accepts. At the extreme, if country T adopts a firm policy
of never letting anyone into the country, this will virtually elimi-
nate the flow of refugees. After all, there is no point in undertaking
a voyage only to be returned.19 Any reduction in the percentage of
people accepted operates in the same direction: it tends to de-
crease the total number of people seeking refuge. But while this
reduction discourages all people from seeking refuge, it does so dif-
ferentially-as we shall show, it disproportionately discourages po-
litical refugees.
A person in country A who has engaged in activities that his
government considers unacceptable, and quite possibly punishable
by death, has basically two choices. First, he can stay in his coun-
try and take measures to avoid his pursuers. Second, he can leave
and seek refuge elsewhere. This second option carries various costs,
including the possibility that he may not reach the country of ref-
uge. Moreover, even if this person does reach his destination, he
might not be permitted to stay. If repatriated, he will once again
face the threat of persecution. Furthermore, as discussed above,
this threat will be greater than if he had never left.2 0 The increase
A' For some emigrants, the risk of the voyage may be very high; Haitians and
Vietnamese have often fled their respective countries by venturing onto the high seas in
small, unseaworthy craft. See Howard W. French, 90 Haitians Drown as Boat Capsizes, NY
Times A9 (Jul 22, 1992); Barbara Crossette, 135 Feared Lost as Haitian Boat Sinks Off
Cuba, NY Times Al (Nov 22, 1991); Jane Fritsch, Judge Acquits Captain of Charge in
Vietnam Refugee's Drowning, LA Times A10 (Feb 17, 1989); UPI, 110 Viet Refugees on
Sailboat Rescued, LA Times A25 (Oct 30, 1985). Similarly, individuals often pay a signifi-
cant portion of their income to make the voyage. Howard W. French, Haitians Still Deter-
mined to Get Out, NY Times A4 (May 25, 1992) (fare of $500 for voyage in October; $100 to
$150 in May); Steven Erlanger, Would-Be Refugee Describes His Vietnamese Round Trip,
NY Times Al (Feb 17, 1990) (fare of $250-$350).
This list is certainly not all-inclusive of costs and benefits. Nor is it suggested that each
person has the same potential costs and benefits.
19 The flow may not fall to zero because (1) some aliens may enter country T without
detection and hence not be repatriated; (2) for various reasons, some aliens may believe that
they will not be repatriated; or (3) if repatriation occurs after long delays, individuals may
flee on the expectation that the danger will have passed before repatriation occurs. See note
14.
As we will discuss at greater length, in the case of Haitians seeking entry to the United
States, an alien whose initial entry to the United States is undetected may raise her asylum
claim in a forum that affords greater procedural protections than the forum provided to
aliens interdicted on the high seas. See Section II.B.
20 See text accompanying notes 13-16.
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in the threat of persecution upon repatriation is an additional cost
to emigration.
Now consider'a person who chooses to leave A but is not fac-
ing possible persecution. This person too faces the costs of emigra-
tion. Also, once in T, he may be repatriated. In contrast to a politi-
cal refugee, however, a repatriated economic refugee is in more or
less the same situation as before he left.-1 Upon his return to A, he
does not face the extra cost of an increased risk of persecution that
a political refugee faces.
If the officials of country T screened aliens perfectly, then peo-
ple with a well-founded fear of persecution would never be repatri-
ated. Screening, however, is far from perfect. Suppose that, faced
with an increasing number of aliens seeking admission, T decides
to grant fewer and fewer of them asylum. To implement this more
restrictive policy, T may well adopt an increasingly poor screening
procedure. This policy has an obvious effect on the total flow of
emigrants and a perverse effect on the composition of the flow.
Certainly, many potential emigrants will be discouraged from emi-
grating to T as they learn of this stricter policy. Perversely, how-
ever, as more and more aliens are repatriated, those people with a
fear of persecution are the most discouraged from emigrating.
These people, after all, have the most to lose from being repatri-
ated, because they face the additional cost of an increased
probability of persecution upon repatriation. Thus, T's restrictive
policy primarily discourages the "wrong" people from seeking asy-
lum. In the next Section we make this argument more precise and
explore its implications.
B. Country T's Policy and the Flow of Aliens from A
Consider two citizens (and residents) of country A, call them E
(for "economic refugee") and P (for "political refugee"). Suppose
they are identical in all respects,2 2 except that P faces the possibil-
ity of persecution at home, while E does not.
Assume that both E and P decide whether to emigrate by
comparing the costs and benefits of remaining at home to the costs
and benefits of leaving. Consider first E's and P's evaluations of
The repatriated alien may actually find himself in a worse position than before he
left for a variety of reasons, including, for instance, the loss of employment. This possible
effect is the same for both a political and economic refugee, however, and so we ignore it for
simplicity.
2' Our qualitative conclusions do not depend on this homogeneity of citizens of
country A.
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remaining in country A. Each faces the same economic hardship
and we may assume that each "values" this hardship in the same
way. P, however, faces an additional danger; if the government of
A persecutes him, his "quality of his life" in A deteriorates dra-
matically. This persecution does not occur with certainty, but only
with some probability. Thus, the value to P of remaining in coun-
try A is less than the value to E. We measure this difference by the
degree to which P's quality of life when persecuted declines, dis-
counted by the probability that such persecution will occur.2"
Now consider the costs and benefits to E and P of emigration
to country T. Since we are interested in people who might leave
their home country, we assume that both E and P value living in T
more highly than living in A.24 Of course, E or P may fail in his
efforts to emigrate. Each might fail for two reasons. First, each
might not survive the voyage to T; this risk is identical for E and
P. 25 Second, once E or P reaches T, he may be excluded from en-
tering and then be repatriated. P, who has a legitimate claim to
asylum, should not face a higher risk of repatriation than E. The
extent to which P's risk of repatriation is lower than E's risk will
depend on the quality of screening done by T.26
The differential risks of repatriation, however, do not com-
pletely capture the different costs that repatriation imposes on E
23 We may represent these ideas symbolically as follows. Let U(A) be the value, or util-
ity, to both E and P of staying in country A, unpersecuted. P, however, faces a probability
of persecution p, if he stays in A. E faces no such danger. If P is persecuted, his utility falls
to some number X, which will be less than U(A) because persecution has lower utility than
non-persecution. P's expected utility from remaining in A is then equal to the sum:
PsX + (1-ps)U(A)
while E's expected utility is simply U(A). The difference is then equal to:
p2[U(A) - X1.
24 Formally we may write the utility that E and P receive from living in country T as
U(T). The assumption that E and P are potentially interested in leaving their home coun-
try, implies that U(A) < U(T).
One might think that P, who faced persecution at home, should receive a greater utility
than E from living in country T. This would double count, however. P receives a greater
potential benefit (the difference between his utility abroad and his expected utility at home)
from his emigration, and this additional benefit is already reflected in his lower expected
utility from staying at home.
25 There are various costs associated with undertaking such a trip, the risk of the voy-
age being only one of them. We denote these costs by a fixed sum C for both people. This is
a fairly general formulation which permits a relatively simple formalism. More cumbersome
formulations would not alter the model in a significant way.
21 Formally, we write that E, who has no political claim to asylum, faces a probability
qE of being returned home and a probability (1-qE) of being permitted to stay in country T.
P, who has a legitimate political claim to asylum, faces a probability qp of deportation, and
a probability (1-qp) of being granted asylum. Assuming that immigration policy is not com-
pletely perverse, P's risk of repatriation will not exceed E's risk-or qE _ qp.
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and P. They face not only different risks of being returned to A
but also different treatment upon return. If returned to his home
country, E will be in a similar situation to the one he was in before
he left; we will assume that E's valuation of life in A after repatria-
tion is the same as his valuation prior to departure. In contrast,
upon P's return he once again faces the risk of persecution. As dis-
cussed above, this risk of persecution will be greater than if he had
never left.2 7 Thus, though E's valuation of life in A upon return is
identical to his valuation prior to departure, P's valuation of life in
A after repatriation is lower than his valuation prior to
departure. 8
Having elaborated the costs and benefits of emigration for E
and P, we can now analyze their decisions whether or not to emi-
grate. E's decision is relatively simple; he compares the value of
remaining in A to the value of life in T, discounted by the
probability that he will be permitted to remain in T and by the
dangers of the voyage.29 If the discounted value of life in T exceeds
the value of life in A, then E will decide to emigrate.
The decision for P is more complex. Like E, P compares the
value of remaining in country A to the value of attempted emigra-
tion. Of course, the benefits of attempted emigration are different
for P, since he faces possible persecution in A. But the costs are
different as well: repatriation exposes him to an increased risk of
persecution. P must consider these additional factors when decid-
ing whether or not to emigrate.30
An increased risk of repatriation discourages both E and P
from emigrating, but it does so differentially. To highlight this dif-
ference, assume for the moment that immigration officials in coun-
try T do not distinguish at all between political and economic refu-
27 See text accompanying notes 13-16.
28 The paragraph embodies several assumptions regarding A's policy toward those repa-
triated. Formally, we assume first that, if repatriated, both P and E still value an unper-
secuted life in A at U(A). Second, we assume that, if repatriated, P's risk of persecution
increases so that Pr > p. Third, we assume that, if repatriated, E still faces no risk of
persecution. We discuss weakening this last assumption in note 47 and accompanying text.
2 Thus, E will attempt emigration to T if and only if:
U(A) < (1-qE)U(T) + qEU(A) - C
30 Thus, P will emigrate if and only if:
(1-P,)U(A) + psX < (1-qp)U(T) + qp[(1-Pr)U(A) + p X)] - C.
The left-hand side of this inequality represents the expected value to P of remaining in A.
The right-hand side represents P's expected value of emigrating, with the first term repre-
senting the value of living in T discounted by the likelihood that T will permit P to stay, the
second term representing the new, lesser valuation of life in A discounted by the probability
that T will repatriate P, and the third term representing the costs associated with the
voyage.
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gees, so that both have the same chance of being admitted."
Assume further that country A takes full advantage of the return
of those people it would like to persecute. Thus, a repatriated po-
litical refugee faces certain persecution.2
These simplifications permit us to reformulate the cost-benefit
comparison that underlies E's and P's decisions to emigrate. 3 Con-
sider E first. We may easily determine E's benefit from emigration.
If E succeeds in staying in T, his benefit is measured by the in-
crease in the quality of his life in T over the quality of his life in A.
Call this increase the "standard of living difference."' 4 In contem-
plating emigration, of course, E must discount this difference by
the probability that T will permit him to stay. E will choose to
emigrate only if the discounted standard of living difference ex-
ceeds the "costs" of emigration. 5
For P the calculation differs slightly. Although the discounted
standard of living difference, the probability of repatriation, and
the cost of the voyage to country T are the same for E and P, there
is also a potential "persecution cost" for P. This persecution cost is
the decrease in P's standard of living from its "ordinary" level in A
to its level when he is persecuted. 6
Note that, on our simple assumption, P is persecuted with cer-
tainty in the event of repatriation. Thus, if P emigrates, he bears
the persecution cost in the event of repatriation or, put differently,
he bears this cost with a probability equal to the probability that T
will repatriate him. On the other hand, if P does not emigrate, he
bears the persecution cost with some other probability. The bene-
fits of emigration then include a term that takes into account the
change in the probability that P will be persecuted. More precisely,
the benefits to P from emigration contain the added benefit of the
persecution cost discounted by the change in the probability that
P will incur this cost. Call this term "the persecution differen-
31 This means that qE = qp = q. Actually, this assumption comes close to describing
reality in some situations. We return to this in Section II. See notes 152-192 and accompa-
nying text.
32 That is, Pr = 1.
E emigrates if and only if:
U(A) < (1-q)U(T) + q U(A) - C.
P emigrates if and only if:
(1-p,)U(A) + pX < (l-q) U(T) + qX - C.
3' The standard of living difference is U(T) - U(A).
35 Thus, E will emigrate if and only if.
[U(T) - U(A)] (1-q) > C.
36 Formally, U(A) - X.
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tial.' '3 7 The persecution differential represents the "added" incen-
tive for P to seek asylum. P, like E, chooses to emigrate if the ben-
efits exceed the costs. The difference between E's cost-benefit cal-
culation and P's calculation equals the persecution differential. As
the prospect of repatriation increases, the discounted standard of
living difference falls equally for P and E. At the same time, how-
ever, the probability that P will be persecuted increases-that is,
the persecution differential falls. Consequently, the benefits of em-
igration decrease more rapidly for P than for E. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, as T increases the rate at which it repatriates aliens, it dis-
courages political emigrants more than economic emigrants.3 8
Moreover, if the prospect of repatriation exceeds the prospect
of persecution from simply staying at home (and taking whatever
preventive measures one can), political refugees have a lower abso-
lute level of benefits from emigration than economic refugees.39
A simple example may clarify our exposition. Suppose that E
and P value "normal" life in A at 100 while each values life in T at
300. The standard of living difference is thus 200. P, if persecuted,
values "life" in A at 0. The persecution cost then equals 100. Sup-
pose the prospect of repatriation (which we have assumed is iden-
tical for E and P) is .8. The discounted standard of living differ-
ence is 40.0 Suppose that the dangers of the voyage impose a cost
valued at 25 by both E and P. Since the discounted standard of
living difference of 40 exceeds the cost of 25, E will emigrate.
Finally, suppose that P's probability of being persecuted if he
remains at home is .6. The change in the probability of persecution
is then (.6 - .8) = -.2, and P's additional "benefit" from emigration
is -20." P's overall benefit from emigration, which is the dis-
counted standard of living difference plus the persecution differen-
tial, is then 20. Because the benefit of emigration is less than the
37The persecution differential is:
(p, - q)[U(A) - X1.
We may conclude that P will emigrate if and only if the sum of the discounted standard of
living difference and the persecution differential exceeds the costs of the voyage:
[U(T) - U(A)] (1-q) + (p. - q) [U(A) - X] > C.
S This fact holds because [U(A) - X] is positive, so that as the probability that asylum
is not granted increases, P is discouraged from seeking asylum "more" than E. Of course,
any given person either finds it beneficial to emigrate or does not. One way to interpret a
statement such as "P is discouraged from emigrating" is that P would now choose to emi-
grate for a smaller range of C's.
"o When q increases beyond p. (i.e., when q > ps), P is less likely to seek asylum than is
E. The reason is clear: if not granted asylum, P faces an increased cost of persecution at
home.
10 That is, 200 x (1-.8) = 40.
41 That is, 100 x (-.2) = -20.
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cost of 25, P will not emigrate. Although E and P are identical in
every respect except that P faces the possibility of persecution at
home, it is E, not P, who leaves to seek asylum.
Now let us relax our simplifying assumptions. The analysis re-
mains essentially unchanged if the home government persecutes
political returnees with a probability less than one.42 In this case,
the change in the probability of persecution depends not only on
the prospect of repatriation but also on the probability that repa-
triated political returnees will be persecuted.4 3 Under this redefini-
tion of the change in the probability of persecution, an individual
with fear of persecution is still less likely to emigrate than a purely
economic emigrant when the prospect of being repatriated and
persecuted exceeds the prospect of being persecuted if one remains
at home.
Suppose further that the immigration procedures in country T
discriminate to some extent between political and economic refu-
gees, so that a person with fear of persecution has a greater chance
of acceptance than one without such a fear.44 P's discounted stan-
dard of living difference now exceeds E's, since P has a greater
chance of staying in T.45 This improved chance gives P an added
incentive to emigrate, which helps offset the disincentive of the
persecution differential when this differential is negative, and rein-
forces the differential when it is positive.41 Whether P or E now
has a greater incentive to emigrate depends upon the parameters
describing country T's policy of exclusion and deportation of
emigrants and country A's policy of persecution of repatriated citi-
zens. In any case, a general policy that raises the probability of
repatriation equally for economic and political refugees still dis-
courages the latter refugees more than the former.
Finally, suppose that economic refugees also face possible per-
secution upon repatriation. Then repatriation imposes the cost of
an increased probability of persecution upon them too. The rela-
42 That is, if Pr < 1.
43 The probability of persecution if P emigrates is now qpr. The change in the
probability of persecution is P, - qp,-
" That is, qE > qp.
P's standard of living difference exceeds E's by:
[U(T) - U(A)] (qE - qp).
46 P will still be less likely to emigrate if:
[U(T) - U(A)] (qE - qp) + (p. - qppr) [U(A) - X] < 0.
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tive incentive to emigrate for E and P now depends upon how the
increase in the probability of persecution compares for E and p.47
C. Implications of the Argument
At the outset, we noted that country T's immigration policy
must balance two types of error: wrongful denials and erroneous
grants of asylum. Given a fixed group of aliens, increasing the rate
of repatriation increases the number of wrongful denials of asylum
to those with a legitimate fear of persecution while decreasing the
number of erroneous admissions of people with no such fear.
The group of emigrants, however, is not fixed beforehand. As
we argued in Section B, the composition of the group of emigrants
depends on country T's immigration policy. As the percentage of
emigrants repatriated increases, country T disproportionately dis-
courages those with legitimate fears of persecution from leaving
country A. Indeed, if country T uses an unreliable screening mech-
anism and routinely repatriates large numbers of refugees, then al-
most no political refugees will emigrate, because they face an in-
creased and disproportionate risk of persecution on return.
Now suppose that country T, under pressure from human
rights groups, seeks to justify its claim that few emigrants from A
are political refugees. Up to this point T has broadly repatriated
refugees, but now it decides carefully to examine the claims of
some number of the emigrants. This "survey" will discover, per-
versely, a low number of wrongful denials. While country T might
conclude that few immigrants are political refugees, its own restric-
tive regime brought about this self-fulfilling prophecy. The flow of
emigrants to T contains few people with a legitimate claim to po-
litical asylum, not because widespread persecution does not exist
in country A, but because those with a legitimate fear of persecu-
tion have been discouraged from coming.
Similarly, if country T, in response to charges that country A
persecutes those repatriated, seeks to document examples of such
persecution, it may find few cases. The reason will not be that po-
litical refugees are not subject to persecution; rather, those under
threat of persecution will not have risked emigrating.
Again, with a fixed group of refugees, repatriating a large
number of them results in many wrongful denials and few errone-
47 Formally, if PE is the probability that E is persecuted upon repatriation (and assum-
ing qE = qp, for simplicity), then P will be less likely to emigrate than E if:
qPE < qPr - Ps"
This assumes that the utility of both E and P fall to X upon persecution.
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ous grants of asylum. With refugee groups that are not fixed, how-
ever, the opposite occurs. When most emigrants are routinely re-
turned, political refugees do not seek asylum and so they cannot be
wrongfully denied admission. In fact, only those without a legiti-
mate claim are granted asylum. T's restrictive repatriation policy
can be carried to its logical conclusion: Reject all emigrants. Then
there will be neither wrongful denials nor erroneous grants of asy-
lum since no one will emigrate. The only remaining error will be in
the policy itself, and policies that tend toward it.
This conclusion suggests that country T's objective should not
simply be the minimization of wrongful denials and erroneous
grants of asylum to a fixed population of aliens. Instead, that ob-
jective should also include the effects of policy on the flow of immi-
grants from A. Thus, country T should consider two other, analo-
gous types of error: wrongful discouragements and erroneous
promptings.48 A policy that rejects all immigrants maximizes
wrongful discouragements.
To implement a proper policy, then, country T must adopt a
screening procedure that adequately differentiates between eco-
nomic and political refugees. Country T must give those with a le-
gitimate fear of persecution a fair opportunity to present their
claims.49
One might alternatively interpret government T's poor screen-
ing and mass repatriation as implementing a governmental policy
which is at variance with the laws of country T and international
law. The evidence of the next Part may be understood as bearing
on the United States' success in implementing a policy that re-
spects domestic and international obligations on the non-refoule-
ment of political refugees or as bearing on the actual aims of the
United States government.50
Note that the argument of Section B does not have legal im-
plications for the evaluations of particular claims of specific indi-
viduals. For simplicity, our model divided the refugee population
into two classes, economic and political, with no distinctions within
48 Discouraging a person with a legitimate fear of persecution is a form of type I error,
while not discouraging someone without a legitimate fear of persecution is a form of type II
error. See note 11.
41Presumably, because the risks of the different errors have dramatically different con-
sequences for aliens claiming asylum, the screening procedures should weigh wrongful deni-
als more heavily than erroneous grants of asylum. Note that a more extensive screening
procedure reduces both types of error.
50 We thank Matthew Spitzer for noting the possibility of these two interpretations of
the model.
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each class. Reality is, of course, more complex. In particular, differ-
ent targets of political persecution will face different probabilities
of being persecuted at home. Thus, even if large numbers of refu-
gees are being returned, political refugees with a very high likeli-
hood of being persecuted may still emigrate in the (small) hope of
being granted asylum or of reaching U.S. shores undetected. The
arguments presented say nothing about the claims of any particu-
lar refugee.
II. AN EXAMPLE: THE REPATRIATION OF HAITIAN REFUGEES
We now apply the arguments developed in the previous Part
to the case of recent U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees. In apply-
ing these arguments, we establish, among others, the following four
points:
1) the assumptions made about country T's closed-door policy
toward immigrants approximate U.S. policy towards Haitian
refugees;5
2) the emigration behavior of potential Haitian refugees is re-
sponsive to U.S. immigration policy;
3) the implementation of U.S. policy towards Haitian refugees
is characterized by poor screening procedures and a high repatria-
tion rate;52 and
4) repatriated political refugees face a higher risk of persecu-
tion than they did prior to departure.
The evidence concerning a fifth point is ambiguous: it is not
clear to what extent repatriated economic refugees face a risk of
persecution. If this risk is small relative to the increase in the risk
11 We establish this fact even though it is not crucial to our argument. It suffices that
the United States bans most immigration of economic refugees. See note 8.
52 United States policy toward Haitian immigrants has had two distinct phases since
the coup. In the first phase, the Coast Guard and the INS implemented Executive Order
12324, 3 CFR § 180 (1981), under which the Coast Guard interdicted vessels on the high
seas and the INS interviewed the intercepted Haitians to determine whether they had a
plausible claim to asylum. This phase ended with the promulgation of Executive Order
12807, 57 Fed Reg 23133 (1992) on May 24, 1992, under which the Coast Guard returns the
interdicted vessels to Haiti without permitting Haitians to assert a claim of asylum. For
further discussion, see text accompanying notes 121-139.
In what follows, we concentrate on the quality of the screening procedures in the first
phase. In the second phase, no screening occurs and all interdicted Haitians are repatriated.
Thus, this second phase is obviously characterized by poor screening procedures and a high
repatriation rate.
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for a political refugee, the conclusions of Section I.C pertain to the
case at hand.53
A. The Structure of United States Immigration Law
The abstract analysis of Part I applies to a country's immigra-
tion policy, that is, the way in which it implements its law. A com-
plete understanding of a policy, however, requires a grasp of the
legal framework in which this policy is implemented. Accordingly,
we begin our discussion of U.S. policy with an overview of the rele-
vant law.
Three different sources of law bear on U.S. immigration pol-
icy. First, and most important, are the immigration statutes, which
have been subject to three major revisions since 1980.54 Second, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes additional require-
ments on the procedures created by the immigration laws.5" Fi-
nally, international treaties impose specific obligations on the
United States with respect to political refugees.5 6 In this Section,
we sketch the legal regime created by these various sources of law.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) creates numerous
categories of aliens seeking admission to the United States. 7 We
focus on categories that concern permanent immigration or politi-
cal asylum.58
The INA imposes numerical limits on worldwide immigration
to the United States. The 1990 amendments increased these limits
to roughly 660,000 immigrant visas for fiscal years 1992-94 and to
"I The model in Section I.B. analyzes the effects of the policies of A and T under vari-
ous conditions. The arguments apply whether or not the conditions for Section I.C. are met.
54 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is codified at 8 USC §§ 1101 et seq
(1988 & Supp 1990). The three major revisions were the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-
212, 94 Stat 102 ("1980 Amendments"); the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 ("1986 Amendments"); and the Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub L No 101-649, 104 Stat 4978 ("1990 Amendments").
" Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC §§ 551 et seq, §§ 701 et seq (1988 & Supp
1990).
5' See, for example, 1967 Protocol, 19 UST at 6223-25 (cited in note 1) (forbidding
repatriation of refugees). The United States recently persuaded the Eleventh Circuit that
these international obligations are not self-executing and hence do not create individual
rights. See Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 949 F2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir 1991), cert de-
nied, 112 S Ct 1245 (1992).
57 8 USC § 1151 (1988 & Supp 1990).
5s We do not discuss various categories of temporary admission that are not relevant to
our discussion, such as aliens in transit through the United States to another destination, 8
USC § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1988), temporary agricultural workers, 8 USC § 1161 (1988 & Supp
1990), and aliens pursuing educational programs in the United States, 8 USC §
1101(a)(15)(J) (1988).
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675,000 thereafter.59 These limits cover three classes of immi-
grants: family-sponsored immigrants,6 employment-based immi-
grants,61 and diversity immigrants.2
Several classes of immigrants are not subject to the numerical
limitations. For our purposes, four are of particular importance: (a)
refugee status, for which aliens outside the United States may ap-
ply at selected locations;6 3 (b) withholding of deportation, for
which aliens within or at the borders of the United States may
apply; 4 (c) asylum status, for which aliens within or at the borders
of the United States may apply;65 and (d) temporary protected sta-
tus, which the Attorney General may designate on a country-by-
country basis.6 6 These provisions impose different substantive and
procedural requirements on applicants; they also offer different
benefits. Moreover, the relation of these provisions of domestic law
to the provisions of the 1967 Protocol are complex.
Consider first the differences among refugee, asylum, and
withholding of deportation status. Most obviously, refugee status
imposes three conditions that do not apply to asylum or withhold-
ing of deportation status: (a) applicants must be outside the
United States;6 (b) they must be "of special humanitarian concern
"' 8 USC § 1151(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (d), and (e) (Supp 1990). Note that these sections
can operate to reduce the numerical limit in a given year below the figures given in the text.
See 8 USC § 1151(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) (Supp 1990).
80 1990 Amendments, 8 USC §§ 1151(a)(1) and (c) (Supp 1990).
81 1990 Amendments, 8 USC §§ 1151(a)(2) and (d) (Supp 1990). The INA limits immi-
grant visas for employment-based immigrants to 140,000 (plus any unused visas from the
prior year) for fiscal years 1992-94 (although this level is set at 0 for 1992). 8 USCA §
1151(d)(2)(A) (Supp 1991).
11 1990 Amendments, 8 USC §§ 1151(a)(3) and (e) (Supp 1990). In fact, for fiscal years
1992-94, no diversity category exists. Id at § 1151(a)(3). Instead, the statute allocates addi-
tional visas to spouses and children of newly legalized aliens, 8 USC § 1151(c)(1)(A), and
visas according to various special transitional programs, 8 USC § 1153 note.
83 8 USC §§ 1151(b)(1)(B), 1157(c)(1) (1988 & Supp 1990).
8, 8 USC § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp 1990).
8 USC § 1158(a) (1988).
88 USC § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp 1990). We do not discuss various amnesties and
adjustments that Congress enacted in the 1986 Amendments. The Cuban-Haitian adjust-
ment, enacted with those amendments, granted visas to large numbers of Haitians who had
entered the country prior to its enactment. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub L No
99-603 § 202, 100 Stat 3359, 3404-05 (1986), codified at 8 USC § 1255a note (1988).
87 8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
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to the United States";"8 and (c) they must apply for the status at a
designated office.6 9
More confusingly, these three statuses do not employ the same
basic definition of "refugee." For purposes of refugee and asylum
statuses, United States law adopts the "well-founded fear" lan-
guage used in the 1967 Protocol. ° Those who seek withholding of
deportation status, however, must meet a different standard. They
must prove that, upon return to their country, their "life or free-
dom would be threatened. 7 1 This language parallels the language
of Article I, paragraph 1 of the 1967 Protocol;72 indeed, Congress
amended this section in 1980 specifically to comply with the inter-
national obligations of the United States. 3
Not only the language differs. In a proceeding for withholding
of deportation, to prove that one's life or freedom would be
threatened, one must meet an objective standard and show that it
is "more likely than not" that one will be persecuted.7 4 In an asy-
lum proceeding,7 5 by contrast, one faces a subjective standard that
looks to the applicant's well-founded fear.76 As a consequence, asy-
68 8 USC §§ 1101(a)(42)(B), 1157(b), 1157(c)(1) (1988). The President, in consultation
with Congress, determines who is of "grave humanitarian concern" to the United States. 8
USC § 1157(b) (1988).
'9 Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook at 171-72, citing 8 CFR § 207.3(6) (1992)
(cited in note 9).
70 Compare the language in the INA:
The term "refugee" means [ ] any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion ....
8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988), with the language of the 1951 Convention, incorporated by
reference in the 1967 Protocol (quoted in note 2).
71 1980 Amendments, 8 USC § 1253(h)(1) (1988 & Supp 1990).
72 The language is quoted in note 1. Note that Article I, paragraph 2 of the 1967 Proto-
col then defines "refugee" using the "well-founded fear of persecution" language. 1967 Pro-
tocol, 19 UST at 6225, 6261 (cited in note 1).
13 INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 429, 436 (1987) (one of Congress's primary
purposes behind the 1980 Amendments was to bring United States refugee law into con-
formance with the 1967 Protocol).
74 INS v Stevic, 467 US 407, 421-22 (1984).
75 Under 8 CFR § 208.3(b) (1992), an application for asylum is also considered an appli-
cation for withholding of deportation. 8 CFR § 208.16(a) (1992) allows the hearing officer to
consider both claims in a single hearing even though the criteria differ. An alien within or
seeking entry to the United States may apply for either status through affirmative action, 8
CFR § 208.4(a),(b) (1992), or as a defense to a deportation or exclusion hearing. 8 CFR §
208.4(c)(1) (1992).
76 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 430-31. In each case, one must also prove that the moti-
vation for the persecution is one of the statutorily listed ones. See id at 423; 8 USC §
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lum or refugee status may be granted even if the likelihood of per-
secution is less than fifty percent; indeed, it may be as low as ten
percent and possibly lower."
Thus, those eligible for asylum (and refugee) status constitute
a broader class of individuals than those eligible for withholding of
deportation.78 Furthermore, once attained, asylum and refugee sta-
tus confer more benefits.7 e An asylee or refugee will be paroled into
the United States and may apply to adjust her status to that of
permanent resident.8 0 But withholding of deportation is country-
specific; thus, the Attorney General need only withhold deporta-
tion to the country in which the alien's life or freedom is
threatened, and the alien may still be deported to any other coun-
try that will accept her.8 1
The fourth immigrant category, temporary protected status, is
a "collective" status and thus differs from asylum, refugee, and
withholding of deportation statuses, which are available only to in-
dividuals. The INA authorizes the Attorney General to grant tem-
porary protected status to the nationals of a country that meets
one of three criteria that indicate that the country suffers from ex-
traordinary political or social unrest or disorder which prevents the
aliens' safe return.82 Temporary protected status may be granted
from six to eighteen months and is renewable.8 3
As applied to Haitians, U.S. immigration policy corresponds
closely to the closed-door policy posited for country T in Part I.
1253(h) (1988 & Supp 1990). The Supreme Court has interpreted this causality requirement
stringently. See, for example, INS v Elias-Zacarias, 112 S Ct 812, 816 (1992) (Guatamalan
who feared retaliation for refusal to join guerilla organization did not demonstrate a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion).
7 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 431, quoting Atle Grahl-Madsen, 1A The Status of Ref-
ugees in International Law 180 (Sijtoff, 1966)("One can certainly have a well-founded fear
of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place
. . . [for example, if] 'every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some
remote labor camp.' ").
718 On the other hand, the Attorney General has discretion to deny asylum status to
individuals eligible for asylum, see 8 USC § 1158(a) (1988), while he must withhold deporta-
tion if an immigrant meets the relevant standard, see 8 USC § 1253(h)(1) (Supp 1990).
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 428 n 5.
7' Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 428 n 6.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 8 USC § 1254a(b)(1) (Supp 1990). These conditions include ongoing armed conflict
within the state, environmental disaster, and temporary inability of the foreign state to han-
dle return of aliens. Id.
83 8 USC § 1254a(b)(2) and (3)(c) (Supp 1990).
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U.S. policy allows for up to 140,000 employment-based visas.8 4 Few
Haitians are granted these visas.8
Haitians remain eligible to apply for refugee, asylum, with-
holding of deportation, or temporary protected status. However,
the Attorney General has refused to grant Haitians temporary pro-
tected status; overseas offices at which Haitians may apply for ref-
ugee status have been, for all practical purposes, inaccessible;8 6
and, as we show below, most Haitians never reach U.S. territory to
apply for asylum or withholding of deportation.
87
B. The Repatriation of Haitian Refugees: 1991-92
On September 30, 1991, a military coup overthrew the demo-
cratically elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 8 By
October 28, the number of Haitians fleeing their country by boat
had dramatically increased. 9 The U.S. government claimed that
these Haitians had fled for economic reasons and sought to prevent
their arrival in U.S. waters and to deny them entry to the United
States.
86 8 USC § 1151(d)(1)(A) (Supp 1990). Note that the number may be higher in a given
year. Id.
85 8 USC § 1153(b) (Supp 1990). For example, in 1989, Haitians were granted 274 em-
ployment-based visas out of a total of 52,755. 1989 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Table 5 (GPO, 1990).
"6 As stated in the text accompanying note 69, applications for refugee status must be
made at specified locations. There were no locations in Haiti until sometime after January
30, 1992, when the State Department announced that it would permit applications for refu-
gee status to be filed at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince. State Dept Briefing, Jan 30,
1992 (Fed News Service), available on NEXIS (EXEC Library, DSTATE File).
It is unclear when the U.S. Embassy first received applications. The text of a state
department briefing on February 18, 1992, indicates a later indefinite starting date. Regard-
less of when such applications were first accepted, it is unlikely that many Haitians who
faced persecution were able to file them. Those living in the countryside face a perilous
journey to Port-au-Prince. Once in Port-au-Prince, approaching the U.S. Embassy would
serve only to alert the military regime to one's presence. Amnesty International, Haiti:
Human Rights Held Ransom 31-32 (August 1992).
17 See notes 121-148 and accompanying text. We have not examined data on the num-
ber of family-sponsored Haitian immigrant visas, but that avenue of entry has not been at
issue in the current debate, probably because these visas must be obtained outside the
United States after long delays. Similarly, the terms of the Cuban-Haitian adjustment,
which are responsible for the issuance of the largest number of immigrant visas to Haitians,
do not apply to the current wave of Haitians seeking entry. Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, Pub L No 99-603 § 202, as amended by Pub L No 100-525 § 2(i), 102 Stat 2612
(1988), codified at 8 USC 1255a note (Supp 1990).
66 Associated Press, Haiti's Military Assumes Power after Troops Arrest the President,
NY Times Al (Oct 1, 1991).
"' Gelbard Statement at 864 (cited in note 5).
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To evaluate U.S. policy in terms of the model of Part I, we
must make four factual determinations. First, has the new military
regime persecuted its political enemies? Second, do United States
screening procedures adequately distinguish between economic and
political refugees? Third, do Haitians with a legitimate fear of per-
secution face, upon repatriation, an increased risk of persecution?
Fourth, is this increase in the risk of persecution greater than the
risk of persecution for those who fled solely for economic reasons?
Resolution of each of these questions presents difficulties. Spe-
cific information about human rights abuses in Haiti is difficult to
obtain, particularly for rural areas. Similarly, controversy sur-
rounds the treatment of repatriated Haitians. Finally, Part I dem-
onstrates the difficulty of assessing immigration policy by mere ob-
servation of the flow of aliens seeking admittance. 0
Despite these difficulties, these questions can be answered suf-
ficiently to apply the discussion of Part I to the case at hand. In
what follows, we consider some of the evidence.
1. Political persecution in Haiti.
Widespread violence and persecution, institutionalized by the
Duvalier regime, have dominated Haiti's recent history. The inau-
guration of Aristide on February 7, 1991, brought a brief respite
from this violence. 1 Since the coup, the violence and persecution
that typified Haiti under the Duvaliers have returned.
To understand the structure of the current repression, one re-
quires some knowledge of Haiti under the Duvaliers. In 1957,
Francois Duvalier took office as President of Haiti. The army,
though instrumental in his accession to power, also threatened its
'o See Section I.C.
" The military sought to justify its September 30th coup by referring to human rights
abuses supposedly perpetrated by the Aristide government. Kenneth Roth, Haiti: The
Shadows of Terror, NY Rev Books 62, 63 (Mar 26, 1991). It alleged, for example, that Aris-
tide's government had condoned numerous crowd lynchings. Id. In fact, three organiza-
tions-Americas Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and Caribbean
Rights-documented 25 lynchings during Aristide's seven-month tenure. Id at 63, citing a
report by these groups entitled Haiti: The Aristide Government's Human Rights Record.
Aristide's government, however, did not participate in these acts. Id at 63. Moreover, most
were not directed at Aristide's political enemies but at common criminals. Id at 63, citing
The Aristide Government's Human Rights Record. As the following text indicates, this vio-
lence by social groups that supported Aristide does not compare in scale, ferocity, or arbi-
trariness with that perpetrated by the military government.
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continuation.9 2 To counterbalance the threat presented by the
army's prominence, Duvalier divided power among several military
and paramilitary groups: most prominently the "Tonton
macoutes," a civil militia (later combined into the "Service
Volontaire Militaire"), and a'presidential guard.9 3 He thus laid the
foundation for "the most oppressive regime in the hemisphere," or
"the most ruthless and oppressive regime in the world."9 '
These armed forces ruled Haiti through a structure of terror
and persecution. In the countryside, local Tonton macoutes served
as section chiefs with unrestricted, arbitrary power over the local
population. These structures of authority survived Francois
Duvalier's death and the succession of his son Jean-Claude to
power in 1971.96 They also survived the ouster of Jean-Claude
Duvalier on February 7, 1986.97 The departure of Baby Doc cre-
ated a political instability that lasted through the internationally
supervised elections of December 16, 1990.11 In these elections,
Aristide received approximately 70% of the vote, with even more
massive majorities in the poorest precincts.9 His victory, however,
did not eradicate the Duvalier regime's oppressive structures: the
military coup that ousted Aristide on September 30, 1991, and the
subsequent violence it has engendered offer the clearest proof that
the instruments of oppression remain entrenched.
The violent- tenor of the current military regime is not dis-
puted. The U.S. Department of State acknowledges, for instance:
"The situation, as we see it, is that there is violence and persecu-
92 Haitian Refugee Center v Civiletti, 503 F Supp 442, 497 (S D Fla 1980), modified on
other grounds, 676 F2d 1023 (11th Cir 1982); Robert D. Crassweller, Darkness in Haiti, 49
Foreign Affairs 315, 317-19 (1971).
13 Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F Supp at 497; Crassweller, 49 Foreign Affairs at 318.
These forces plus the army have historically received 60% to 70% of government spending.
Crassweller, 49 Foreign Affairs at 317.
94
"Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F Supp at 475. The first judgment represents the opin-
ion of the State Department Country Officer for Haiti in 1980; the second was made by the
International Commission of Jurists in 1977. Id.
" Id at 498, 501; Roth, NY Rev Books at 63 (cited in note 91).
" Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F Supp at 500; Roth, NY Rev of Books at 63 (cited in
note 90).
" Hogan, Uprooting Duvalierism, Commonweal 518, 518 (Sept 25, 1987).
" See Howard W. French, Soldiers in Haiti Oust One General; Install Another, NY
Times Al (Sep 19, 1988); Howard W. French, Haiti in Turmoil in Wake of Coup, NY Times
Al (Sep 21, 1988); Howard W. French, Boldly, Duvalier Bullies Step From the Shadows,
NY Times A4 (Jul 20, 1990); Associated Press, Major Changes in Haiti's Recent History,
NY Times A18 (Mar 11, 1990) (presenting a detailed chronology of political events in Haiti
from 1986 to 1990).
" Howard W. French, Haitians' Lament, NY Times A3 (Jun 20, 1991).
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tion in Haiti."' 00 Human rights organizations have estimated that
1000 Haitians were killed in the two weeks after the coup,110 and
that an additional 500 people were killed between mid-October
and mid-December. 0 2 Thousands of people remain in hiding. 03
The military has directed its violence primarily against Aris-
tide's supporters.
The list of the army's victims reads like a glossary of the
many dynamic and outspoken organizations that had come to
populate the Haitian political landscape in recent years. The
many lively and combative radio stations-the main form of
communication with Haiti's dispersed and largely illiterate
population-have been silenced, or reduced to innocuous pro-
gramming. The spirited trade unions and popular organiza-
tions have been neutralized, with their leaders arrested or in
hiding and their members too terrified to assemble. Entire
neighborhoods-especially those poor and populous shanty-
towns in Port-au-Prince and across the country that voted for
Aristide almost unanimously and that have filled the ranks of
popular organizations during the past five years-have been
targeted for particularly brutal and concentrated attacks. 04
The persecution and terror have continued since December. In
that month, Astrel Charles, a member of the Haitian Chamber of
Deputies, was killed.10 5 On January 25, plainclothes police "beat
several political leaders and gunned down one of their body-
guards."' 0 6 The same day, thugs beat Rene Theodore-who had
100 Richard Boucher, State Dept Briefing, Feb 14, 1992, (Fed News Serv), available on
NEXIS (EXEC library, DSTATE file) 1, 2.
101 Anne Fuller and Amy Wilentz, Return to the Darkest Days: Human Rights in Haiti
Since the Coup 2 (Americas Watch, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev). Darkest Days ex-
plains that the State University Hospital in Port-au-Prince reports most estimates of deaths
and other casualties but that few victims of violence, even in Port-au-Prince, are likely to go
to the hospital for treatment. Id at 3.
102 Id at 2. Haiti has a population of 6 million. The murder of 1500 individuals amounts
to the murder of .025% of the total population in two months. A comparable murder rate in
the United States would result in 395,000 murders per year. The actual number of murders
in the United States in 1991 was 24,020. Tom Squitieri, Slayings Set Record in '91, USA
Today 5A (Jan 7, 1992).
'03 Roth, NY Rev Books at 63 (cited in note 91) ("Tens of thousands-by some esti-
mates 200,000-are in hiding."). Two hundred thousand people constitute 3.33% of the en-
tire population. An equivalent percentage of U.S. citizens in hiding would amount to slightly
more than 8.33 million people.
104 Fuller and Wilentz, Darkest Days at 1 (cited in note 101).
101 Michael Tarr, Gunman Fires on Haiti Lawmaker as Refugee Repatriation Contin-
ues, Reuter Library Rep (Feb 12, 1992), available on NEXIS (OMNI file).
106 Id.
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been accepted by both Aristide and representatives of the National
Legislature as a compromise prime minister to smooth the way for
Aristide's return-and murdered Theodore's bodyguard. 10 7 On
February 8, during Carnival in Port-au-Prince, armed men fired on
a crowd chanting a Protestant song used as code by Aristide sup-
porters. 10 8 On February 12, Jean Mandenave, a member of the
Chamber of Deputies, reported that gunmen shot at him.' 9 In ad-
dition, seventy houses belonging to Mandenave's friends and rela-
tives in his native town in northern Haiti were burned down.1 0 A
second deputy to the National Assembly had his house and the
houses of forty friends and relatives destroyed by arson,,"
In early February, a section chief punished an isolated village
in northern Haiti for its support of Aristide."12 Around February
11, a National Public Radio (NPR) reporter and a reporter for the
Chicago Tribune visited this village "where about 120 houses were
burned down and several inhabitants killed for their support of
Aristide. ''"1 3 When they returned to the neighboring village where
they had left their car, the local enforcer and twenty armed thugs
awaited them.1 4 These men were later joined by Jean-Marie
Voltaire, the section chief who had destroyed the village."' Tom-
linson, the NPR reporter, stated that "He'd killed people up there,
[Voltaire] said, and it was best to kill [Tomlinson and his compan-
... See Michael Tarr, Haiti Government Says Policemen to be Tried for Slaying, Reu-
ter Library Rep 1 (Jan 27, 1992), available on NEXIS (OMNI file). In response, the United
States withdrew its ambassador to Haiti on January 27, 1992. See Joe Snyder, State Dept
Briefing, Jan 27, 1992 (Fed News Serv), available on NEXIS (EXEC library, DSTATE file).
One month later, the State Department announced that the Ambassador would return "im-
mediately" to Haiti to help implement accords to restore Aristide. Jim Lobe, Haiti: U.S.
Orders Ambassador's Return to Port-au-Prince, Inter Press Serv (Feb 26, 1992), available
on NEXIS (OMNI file).
108 Letter from Father Antoine Adrien, Congregation du Saint-Esprit, to Cheryl Little
of the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami, Florida (Feb 20, 1992) ("Adrien Letter") (on file
with U Chi L Rev). This letter also reports on many of the other incidents discussed in this
paragraph.
109 Tarr, Reuter Library Rep (Feb 12, 1992) (cited in note 105).
110 Adrien Letter (cited in note 108).
,1 Id.
112 Alan Tomlinson, reporter, First-Hand Witness to Haiti Repression 18, transcript
from All Things Considered (Natl Pub Radio Feb 20, 1992), available on NEXIS (OMNI
file).
,, Haiti: U.S. Repatriations to 'Killing Field' under Attack, Inter Press Serv (Feb 14,
1992), available on NEXIS (OMNI file).
... Tomlinson, All Things Considered, Feb 20 at 4 (cited in note 112).
11 Alan Tomlinson, reporter, Military Oppression Witnessed in Haiti 6, transcript
from All Things Considered (Natl Pub Radio Feb 13, 1992), available on NEXIS (OMNI
file).
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ions] too. Voltaire told us he was known as The Robot because the
army employs him like an automaton to do its dirty work." 116
Tomlinson also reported, "I found evidence of repression
wherever I traveled in Haiti."1 7 He observed, for example, of Cap
Haitien, Haiti's second largest city:
Soldiers come around these . . . poor neighborhoods every
night shooting and warning the women that if they find their
menfolk on the street they'll be shot or beaten. Anybody who
. . . is an avid supporter of Aristide, who voted for him, who
. . . just lives in an area that has been fervent in its support is
in danger .... 118
Violence against Aristide's grass roots supporters also contin-
ues. The Los Angeles Times quoted a human rights monitor on an
inspection that included officials of the U.S. Government Account-
ing Office:
There is an extremely high level of tension and fear caused by
an obvious policy of brutality and repression by the army, by
section chiefs (local agents of the central government) and by
attaches," he said, referring to local thugs hired by the mili-
tary to terrorize citizens. 119
Taken together, this evidence suggests that Haiti has no
shortage of individuals with a legitimate fear of persecution. 20
116 Id.
117 Id.
18 Tomlinson, All Things Considered, Feb 13 at 6 (cited in note 115).
'1 Kenneth Freed, No Evidence Haitians Sent Home by U.S. Have Been Mistreated,
Investigators Say, LA Times A10 (Mar 16, 1992).
120 The State Department's position seems to be that the large number of people with
legitimate fear of persecution hinders any single individual's attempt to gain political asy-
lum. The following exchange suggests that the Haitian regime's targeting of neighborhoods
and groups that overwhelmingly supported Aristide makes it more difficult, in the State
Department's view, for an individual to show he has been singled out:
Q: Not to belabor this point, but groups like-human rights groups like Amnesty Inter-
national and some others described even today again that Haiti is a killing field, essen-
tially that they are getting reports of people being tortured and killed. What explains
this dramatic difference between what they're hearing and what your people apparently
are not?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't think there is that much of a difference, and I think if you
look at our human rights report, you'll see how we report on the very deplorable condi-
tions that do exist in Haiti. And it's for that reason that we interview people: to ex-
amine, based on our law, whether those individuals would face this kind of violence if
they were sent back to Haiti. People that we think have a plausible claim to this well-
founded fear of persecution are, in fact, the people who are allowed to pursue that
claim and who are not sent back. People that don't have a plausible claim that they
1992] 1447
The University of Chicago Law Review
2. U.S. immigration policy toward Haiti prior to the coup.
U.S. immigration policy treats Haitian immigrants differently
than immigrants of other nationalities. 2' The most significant dif-
ference for our purposes results from the policy of interdiction.
This policy has had two phases, corresponding to the two executive
orders that have implemented it.
The interdiction policy began when, on September 29, 1981,
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12324 on the "Interdic-
tion of Illegal Aliens."' 22 This Order had three components. First,
it directed the Secretary of State to enter into "cooperative ar-
rangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose
of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea."' 23 Pre-
sumably, these cooperative arrangements would authorize the
United States to board ships carrying the flag of the cooperating
country. Second, it directed the Coast Guard to intercept illegal
aliens on the high seas and thereby prevent their entry to the
United States. 24 Specifically, the Executive Order directed the
Coast Guard to stop and board vessels 25 on the high seas when it
had reason to believe that these vessels were "engaged in the irreg-
ular transportation of persons" and to return these vessels to their
port of embarkation. 2 6 Third, it required both the Coast Guard
and the Attorney General to assure that no "person who is a refu-
gee will be returned without his consent.' ' 27
Despite the neutral wording of this Executive Order, the
United States has, to our knowledge, entered into only one such
cooperative agreement. On September 23, 1981, the United States
exchanged letters with the government of President-for-life Jean-
Claude Duvalier whereby the United States was granted permis-
might face that kind of violence or be singled out or have that well-founded fear, those
are the people that are sent back.
Boucher, State Dept Briefing, Feb 14, 1992, at 12 (cited in note 100) (emphasis added).
121 In other years, Haitians have been granted political asylum at a much lower rate
than applicants from other countries. In 1990, for example, there were 73,637 asylum appli-
cations from all countries of which 5.7% were granted. 1990 Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service 106 (GPO, 1991). One-half percent of all asylum
applications by Haitians were granted. Id.
22 Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Executive Order No 12324 (Sep 29), 3 CFR 180 (1981).
123 Id at 181.
124 Id.
125 The Executive Order, of course, is limited to those vessels over which the United
States has some legal authority, i.e., U.S. vessels and vessels of countries with which cooper-
ative agreements have been signed, as well as vessels without nationality and hence unpro-
tected by international law. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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sion to intercept Haitian flag vessels whenever the United States
believed they were involved in the illegal transport of persons com-
ing from Haiti. 128
The first phase of U.S. interdiction policy lasted until May 24,
1992, when President Bush issued Executive Order 12807.129 This
order directed the Coast Guard to return an interdicted vessel to
the country from which it came. In so doing, it also removed the
requirement that the Attorney General assure that no political ref-
ugee was returned. °30 In fact, the Coast Guard now returns all in-
terdicted Haitians directly to Haiti without any interview. 3',
Interdiction is a unique tool of immigration policy because, ac-
cording to the United States, it denies aliens intercepted on the
high seas the procedural protections of U.S. immigration laws. The
United States only affords these protections to those within its
borders or applying for entry at a port of entry. 3 2 Thus, though
Executive Order 12324 and implementing regulations of the INS
"' Migrants-Interdiction, Sep 23, 1981, 33 UST 3559, 3560, TIAS No 10,241.
129 Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, 57 Fed Reg 23133 (1992). President Bush has ex-
plained his directive to repatriate all Haitians by claiming that "the vast majority of refu-
gees are economic." Barbara Crossette, U. N. Official Rebukes U.S. on Haitians, NY Times
A3 (May 28, 1992) Even if this claim were true, it is not clear how it justifies the return of
all aliens. For example, we would not infer from the claim "the vast majority of individuals
indicted for a crime are criminals" that we should proceed directly to sentencing.
13 Section 2(c)(3) states that the "Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion,
may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his consent." Id
(emphasis added). The United States has chosen not to determine whether any passengers
on interdicted boats have a well-founded fear of persecution. Crossette, NY Times A3 (May
28, 1992) (cited in note 129).
131 Crossette, NY Times A3 (May 28, 1992).
13" The United States makes two distinct claims with respect to its legal obligations: (1)
that the INA does not extend to aliens who are outside the borders of the United States or
not seeking entry at a port of entry; and (2) that it has no international obligations of non-
refoulement of such aliens. We consider these two claims in turn.
The circuits are in conflict over the claim that the non-refoulement provisions of U.S.
immigration law apply to aliens outside the United States. In litigation before both the
Eleventh and Second Circuits, the United States asserted that these provisions do not ex-
tend to persons beyond the borders of the United States. In Haitian Refugee Center v
Baker, 953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir 1992), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1245 (1992), the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the INS position:
The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and limits the application of the
provision to aliens within the United States' borders or ports of entry. The Plaintiffs in
this case have been interdicted on the high seas and have not yet reached "a land
border" or a "port of entry." Therefore, their claims under the INA must fail.
Id at 1510 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit, by contrast, rejected the INS argument
and held that Haitians intercepted in international waters benefit from the non-refoulement
provisions of U.S. law. Haitian Centers Council v McNary, 969 F2d 1350 (2d Cir 1992), cert
granted, 61 USLW 3156, 1992 US App LEXIS 17372.
[T]he command of section 243(h) [of the INA] is absolute: the alien shall not be re-
turned to face persecution. That command cannot be circumvented by seizing the alien
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provided interdicted aliens the right to claim asylum, the United
States used a more cursory and less accurate screening procedure.
In practice, as we discuss at greater length in the next subsection,
the United States quickly determined which Haitians should have
been permitted to file a claim for asylum and repatriated the rest.
Under Executive Order 12807, interdicted Haitians are returned
immediately to Haiti without any screening.
The interdiction program has a dramatic effect on the flow of
Haitian emigrants to the United States. In early 1981, roughly
1500 Haitians per month, or 18,000 per year, sought refuge in the
United States. 133 By 1983, with little or no change in economic,
social, or political conditions in Haiti, the number of Haitians
seeking entry to the United States had fallen to less than 1000 per
year.13 4
as he approaches our border, whether by land or by sea, and returning him to his
persecutors.
Id at 1369 (Newman concurring).
Moreover, the executive branch denies that international law imposes an obligation of
non-refoulement. In his most recent Executive Order concerning interdiction, President
Bush asserted in the preamble:
The international legal obligations of the United States under the [1967] Protocol to
apply Article 33 of the [1951] Convention do not extend to persons located outside the
territory of the United States.
Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Executive Order No 12807, 57 Fed Reg 23133 (1992). See also
1967 Protocol (cited in note 1); 1951 Convention (cited in note 1). The State Department
had earlier asserted this position in congressional hearings. See, for example, Hearing on
Haitian Detention and Interdiction before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 33, 37-43
(1989) ("Interdiction Hearing") (statement of Alan Kreczko, deputy legal adviser, Depart-
ment of State). Accord, Haitian Refugee Center v Gracey, 809 F2d 794, 841 (DC Cir 1987)
(Edwards concurring and dissenting) (dicta).
This claim was disputed by experts in international law. See, for example, Interdiction
Hearing at 161 (statement of Professor Goodwin-Gill). The Second Circuit failed to reach
the international law issue, having found in the plaintiff's favor under the INA, but stated
that the protections afforded by the INA and the 1951 Convention are "coextensive." Mc-
Nary, 969 F2d at 1367.
133 U.S. Dept of State, Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation: Report to the
Congress for Fiscal Year 1985 87 (1984).
1- Id at 87 (stating that less than 500 Haitians sought entry to the United States in
1983). Those interdicted do not count as individuals seeking entry to the United States. As
Table 1 indicates, 511 Haitians were interdicted in fiscal year 1983, and only 358 in 1982.
Note that official statistics tend to overstate the rate of asylum grants to Haitians, be-
cause those Haitians on interdicted vessels who were deemed not to have plausible asylum
claims were returned without being permitted to assert the claim.
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Table 1 illustrates the extent of interdiction of Haitians since
the program commenced at the start of fiscal year 1982.135 The
number of interdictions has varied with the political climate in Ha-
iti. While the establishment of the program stemmed the flow of
Haitians, so that few were interdicted at the outset, the number of
interdictions rose as political uncertainty grew in Haiti. This un-
certainty arose initially as a result of popular demonstrations to
overthrow Duvalier and of the attendant repression, and it contin-
ued as a result of the political turmoil engendered by Duvalier's
departure and of the struggle of his agents to retain power. 36 In-
terdictions fell in fiscal year 1990 (Oct 1989 - Sep 1990) with the
approach of the elections of December 16, 1990.137 Virtually every
interdicted Haitian was repatriated. Others were permitted to file
claims for political asylum, but virtually none of these asylum
claims were granted. In fact, from the inception of the program
through early 1989, only five interdicted Haitians were granted an
opportunity to apply for asylum;"8' a Haitian who fled his country,
survived the voyage, but was interdicted thus had a chance of less
than 25 in 100,000 of being admitted to the United States.
TABLE 1
Haitian Migration Interdiction Program
Fiscal Years 1982-1992
(a) Frequency of Interdictions by Year
# 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992*
Interdicted 358 511 1,581 3,721 3,422 2,866 4,262 4,902 871 2,067 16,124
(b) Cumulative Frequency of Interdictions by Year
# 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992*
Interdicted 358 869 2,450 6,171 9,593 12,459 16,721 21,623 22,494 24,561 40,685
Source: The number of interdictions was reported by the U.S. Coast Guard to the National
Coalition for Haitian Refugees. (Telecopier communication on file with U Chi L Rev).
* Through February 29, 1992.
M' The interdiction figures represent the number of Haitians stopped on the high seas;
they do not include Haitians who otherwise entered the United States legally or illegally, or
who were excluded at the border. Table 1 was compiled in March, 1992.
131 See text accompanying notes 91-98.
11" See text accompanying note 97.
138 Interdiction Hearing at 117 (cited in note 132) (statement of Jocelyn McCalla, Na-
tional Coalition for Haitian Refugees). McCalla states that only 5 of 20,530 interdicted indi-
viduals were found to have sufficient basis to pursue an asylum claim in the United States.
Id. Table 1 provides more recent data on the number of interdictions. The State Depart-
ment maintains that 28 out of 24,559 individuals interdicted between October 1, 1981 and
September 30, 1991 were permitted to pursue their asylum claims. Telecopier communica-
tion from Hazel Reitz, Bureau for Refugee Programs, State Department (Dec 9, 1992) (on
file with U Chi L Rev).
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Of course, some Haitians who fled did reach the United States.
These individuals, if stopped at a port of entry or detected later
within the United States, had an opportunity to file for asylum
with the District Director. Table 2 presents data on the number of
applications for asylum filed with INS District Directors and the
number of asylum grants for the period 1980-91. As Table 2 indi-
cates, during this period the United States considered over 5900
applications for asylum from Haitians. Fifty-nine such applications
were granted. Thus, one percent (or 1 in 100) of those who reached
U.S. shores and applied for asylum succeeded.
TABLE 2
Asylum Applications with INS District Directors to Haitians
Fiscal Years 1980-1991
# 1980* 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991**
Grants 2 5 3 8 23 4 2 0 6 3 2 1
Filings 99 503 390 376 2,163 631 176 75 314 678 425 105
Total Number of Asylum Grants, FY 1980-1991:
59.
Total Number of Asylum Applications, FY 1980-1991:
5935.
Source: Telephone conversation with INS Statistics Division (202 376 3066).
*July-October.
**October 1990 - March 1991
From the perspective of our analysis in Part I, Haitians base
their decision to emigrate on the overall chance of gaining asylum.
Allowing for the differences in time periods of the two statistics
noted above, the sixty-one asylum applications granted out of
roughly 25,500 Haitians who were either interdicted or reached
U.S. shores and applied for asylum best indicate this chance. This
represents an acceptance rate of less than .25 percent.139 The dra-
matic drop in 1981 in the number of people seeking refuge (from
18,000 to less than 1000/year) shows that the Haitians responded
to the tightening of enforcement of U.S. immigration policy.
139 To calculate this number, we added the number of asylum applications through FY
1989 (4,803) to the number of interdictions at the time McCalla testified (21,623). See note
138. We then divided this number into the sum of the five grants of asylum to those inter-
dicted plus the 56 grants of asylum made in hearings (through 1989) before the District
Director.
1452 [59:1421
Unsafe Havens
3. U.S. immigration policy toward Haiti since the coup.
The government of Aristide was overthrown toward the end of
September, 1991.140 In the weeks that followed, the Haitian Migra-
tion Interdiction Program did not intercept any vessels with Hai-
tian refugees. 141 By November 19, 1991, however, it had inter-
cepted 2,200 Haitians.142 By February 18, 1992, more than 16,000
Haitians had been intercepted on the high seas, with 6,653 inter-
cepted in the month of January alone.' 43 INS officials found, in
preliminary screening, that of these 16,124 Haitians, 6,446 had
plausible claims to refugee status.'" They now await full-scale
hearings in the United States where success is far from certain. 145
These increased emigration figures are not inconsistent with
our earlier determination that U.S. policy had severely cut off the
flow of refugees. Since the fall of Duvalier in 1986 and the elections
of 1990, many more people have been politically active and demon-
strated a firm opposition to the structures of the old regime. The
numbers of Haitians with well-founded fears of persecution may
thus have increased. Immediately after the coup, Haitians with
such fears might reasonably have expected that now they would
qualify for asylum status under U.S. law. After all, the United
States had denounced the coup and, in conjunction with the Or-
ganization of American States, placed an embargo on trade with
Haiti until Aristide's restoration.' 46 In the first large flow of Hai-
140 Associated Press, NY Times at Al (Oct 1, 1991) (cited in note 88).
"I Gelbard Statement, Dept of State Dispatch at 864 (Nov 25, 1991) (cited in note 5).
142 Id.
1"I Barbara Crossette, U.S. Starts Return of Haiti Refugees After Justices Act, NY
Times Al, A12 (Feb 2, 1992).
14 U.S. Completes its Forced Repatriation of Haitians, Chi Trib 4 (Mar 18, 1992).
140 If history is any indication, these screened-in Haitians have little reason to be hope-
ful. Recall that from September 1981 through mid-1989, this policy resulted in grants of
asylum to only 61 out of roughly 25,500 Haitian immigrants.
Of course, since May 24, 1992, all Haitians interdicted on the high seas are returned to
Haiti without an opportunity to claim asylum. Thus, under current policy, the likelihood is
identical for economic and political refugees.
"' See Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Haiti, Executive Order No
12779 (Oct 28, 1991), 56 Fed Reg 55975 (1991).
Sanctions on Haiti evolved over time. On October 1, 1991, the United States suspended
all aid to Haiti. Margaret Tutwiler, State Dept Briefing, Oct 1, 1991 (Fed News Serv), avail-
able on NEXIS (EXEC database, DSTATE file). On October 3, 1991, the State Department
suspended munitions export licenses to Haiti. Dept of State, Notice of Suspension of Muni-
tions Export Licenses to Haiti, 56 Fed Reg 50968 (Oct 9, 1991). On October 4, 1991, Presi-
dent Bush issued Executive Order 12775 thereby freezing the assets of the Haitian Govern-
ment and blocking financial transfers to illegal authorities. Prohibiting Certain Transactions
with Respect to Haiti, Executive Order 12775 (Oct 4, 1991), 56 Fed Reg 50641 (1991). On
October 28, 1991, President Bush issued Executive Order 12779, which prohibited all trade
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tian emigrants after the coup, then, one might have anticipated a
substantial number of political refugees.
The treatment of roughly 6,000 emigrants in November may
have served, for those remaining in Haiti, as the best indicator of
how accurately the United States distinguished between economic
and political refugees. 147 After all, individuals remaining in Haiti
would learn of U.S. policy through various channels, including re-
ports from those repatriated in November. 148 The decisions of sub-
sequent emigrants would then be shaped by their new perception
of U.S. policy.
Determination of the accuracy of U.S. screening procedures
presents obvious difficulties. We have three sources of evidence.
First, we report evidence concerning the intentions of the United
States and the public expression of these intentions. Second, we
report evidence, developed in litigation against the United States,
that bears directly on the likely accuracy of this early screening. As
this action was brought in mid-November, most of the evidence
developed there bears on the treatment of the initial flow of
emigrants. Third; we discuss evidence concerning the "improved"
screening procedures begun in late December.
a) The intentions of the U.S. policy toward Haitian
emigrants. Shortly after the first wave of interdictions following
the coup, the United States effectively announced that few Hai-
tians would be granted political asylum. The Voice of America's
Creole language broadcast in Haiti carried the message that,
"[w]ith very few exceptions, Haitians picked up on the high seas
will not be brought to the United States.' 149
Similarly, the official diplomatic position has been that the let-
ter of agreement of September, 1981, placed the United States
with Haiti except for humanitarian trade involving essential foods and medicines. 56 Fed
Reg at 55975. This order took effect on November 5, 1991. Id at 55976.
147 We take as given that United States officials are at least applying the law and re-
jecting only those refugees who have been designated as economic. Put differently, any re-
jected refugee has essentially been classified as economic.
"' Roughly 500 Haitians were repatriated in November before a district judge in
Miami temporarily restrained the United States from such action. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 3 (Dkt No 91-1292, filed Feb 10, 1992) (on
file with U Chi L Rev) ("Baker Cert Petition"); Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 789 F
Supp 1552, 1557 (S D Fla 1991), rev'd, 949 F2d 1109 (l1th Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct
1245 (1992).
149 Humanitarian Appeal to Haitian Boat People, Statement of the Assistant Secretary
of State, Nov 15, 1991, in Dept of State Dispatch 849 (Nov 18, 1991).
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under an obligation to return Haitians to Haiti150 and that it
wanted "to avoid any action that would encourage more Haitians
to risk their lives by boarding unsafe vessels in the belief that this
would ensure them passage to the United States."''
b) Evidence regarding November, 1991 screening proce-
dures. We now turn to the screening procedures used by the INS
in November, 1991. According to INS Guidelines, this screening
had two phases. First, an INS officer would "speak" (through an
interpreter) with each person aboard the interdicted vessel.152 On
the basis of this conversation, the INS officer would determine
whether "there is any indication of possible qualification for refu-
gee status.' 5 3 If so, the INS officer would interview that individual
"out of the hearing of other persons" and make a determination
concerning the claim for refugee status. 54 In principle, a log was
kept of each initial conversation, as well as records of each individ-
ual interview. 155
Evidence gathered by attorneys for the plaintiff in Haitian
Refugee Center v Baker 56 suggests that actual screening resulted
in most Haitians being classified as "economic" rather than "politi-
cal" refugees and that this classification did not accurately distin-
guish between political and economic refugees.
In the early stages of the screening, INS officials believed that
no Haitians would be returned. 157 Despite this, 538 Haitians with
"doubtful" cases who had been screened out were returned on No-
vember 18 without any reinterviews. 58 Several Haitians screened
out in this preliminary process, and hence subject to repatriation,
testified (credibly, in the opinion of the district court judge) that
they had fled Haiti after the murder or incarceration of parents,
siblings, or other close relatives. 59
"I Gelbard Statement, at 864 (cited in note 5).
151 Id.
152 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interdiction Guidelines and Operation
Instructions, HMIO ("Guidelines"), reproduced in Baker Cert Petition, Exhibits section at
7, 9 (cited in note 148). See also Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 1498, 1502 (11th
Cir 1992), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1245 (1992) (describing INS guidelines).
Guidelines, in Baker Cert Petition, Exhibits section at 9.
'5, Id. The standard for refugee status is that imposed by the 1967 Protocol and the
INA.
Id.
953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir 1992), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1245 (1992).
157 Baker Cert Petition at 3 (cited in note 148).
158 Id.
"I Id at 6-7 and n 6.
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The INS officers conducting the initial conversations and in-
terviews had little or no training or knowledge about Haitian poli-
tics. For example, they could not identify various past and contem-
porary political actors such as Francois Duvalier, Marc Bazin (an
American-supported candidate for President in 1990), Roger
Lafontant (a prominent Tonton macoute who had attempted a
coup prior to Aristide's inauguration in February, 1991), or Gen-
eral Cedras (the current head of the army).160 Nor did they know
the names of national or grassroots organizations of Aristide sup-
porters, members of which the military regime targeted
frequently. 6 '
Most preliminary screenings occurred on Coast Guard cutters
or at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay. On board the
Coast Guard vessels, this process was cursory. No adequate records
were kept. Often, officers on the Coast Guard cutters failed to note
who had been screened in and who had been screened out. Often,
Haitians were moved from cutter to cutter and reinterviewed. Ini-
tially, the interview forms contained no space for a credibility de-
termination. 62 Finally, the interviews lasted roughly 7.5 minutes
per individual. 63 Of course, in this period, both questions and an-
swers had to be translated so that actual interview time was under
four minutes. The interview records were reviewed by a supervis-
ing INS official, at least one of whom never requested any
reinterviews.'6 4
The screening procedure at Guantanamo Bay was apparently
no better. Testimony indicates that asylum officers did not even
know the standard for determining refugee status. 6 5 Nor did they
have greater knowledge of the political situation in Haiti.'6 6 These
interviews, conducted through an interpreter, were estimated to be
no longer than eight minutes and more probably lasted less than
six minutes per claimant.117
The district court, in its order granting a preliminary injunc-
tion in Baker, discusses in detail the treatment of five Haitians
interviewed. Each individual was a member of a grassroots organi-
160 Id at 10 n 10, n 11.
161 Id.
162 Id at 10-11.
163 Id at 13.
'" Id at 14.
166 Id at 15
' Id at 17.
167 Id at 15.
1456 [59:1421
Unsafe Havens
zation supporting Aristide,6 8 and in each instance, the individual
had been "'screened out' and not allowed to continue the applica-
tion process."169 One, Raymond Edme, "fled Haiti after he learned
the military had come to his home searching for him. 1 7 The sec-
ond, Roland Providence, "fled Haiti after learning from his broth-
ers that the military shot up his house looking for him."' 7' The
third, Eric Pierre, "fled... based on warnings that the army had
previously been to his home and sprayed it with bullets, killing his
father.' 1 72 The fourth, Golbert Miracle fled after "Miracle's mother
* . .was shot to death by the soldiers. Miracle's aunt and sisters
were arrested by the soldiers and their whereabouts are un-
known.' 1 3 The fifth, Roland Jean, escaped arrest and fled after
the "Haitian police forcibly arrested his father."'" 4 None of these
five was given an opportunity to state his claim in any detail dur-
ing the brief interviews. 175 One was told by his interviewer that:
"Everybody comes here and talks about one thing, politics, poli-
tics. Whatever you do, you are going to be sent back. Whatever you
do." '7 6
c) Evidence regarding later screening procedures. This
litigation created political pressure on the Bush Administration to
improve the screening process. Though evidence suggests that the
process improved, it remained unreliable. Subsequently, with the
promulgation of Executive Order 12807, the Bush Administration
reverted to the least reliable screening procedure of repatriating all
interdicted aliens. For instance, congressional investigators have
alleged that twenty-five to thirty Haitians, whom the INS had de-
termined had credible claims for asylum, were nonetheless repatri-
ated. 7 By contrast, roughly fifty Haitians whose asylum claims
had been dismissed by the INS were sent to Florida for processing
of their asylum claims. 7 8
1"8 Baker, 789 F Supp at 1576.
169 Id.
120 Id. Judge Atkins cites to the depositions of the five individuals.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id at 1577.
178 Id.
177 Christopher Marquis, Traffickers Thrive in Haiti, U.S. Says Cocaine Seized Aboard
Flights to N.Y., Miami Herald 19A (Apr 10, 1992).
178 Id.
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The affidavits of four individuals who served as interpreters at
Guantanamo from Christmas, 1991, through mid-January, 1992,
offer additional and compelling evidence concerning the unreliabil-
ity of the later screening procedures. One stated: "In general, the
screening in and screening out process is very arbitrary.' 1 9 An-
other opined: "[M]any [Haitians] were unjustly disqualified and
screened out."8 0
More suggestive than these conclusory statements, however, is
the detailed description of the process provided by these affidavits.
According to the interpreters, interviews to screen the Haitians
were often conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation'' by ill-
informed and insensitive officials."8 2 In addition, only three train-
ing sessions, lasting ninety minutes each, were provided to the INS
adjudicators.'83 These sessions were conducted by the two non-
Haitian interpreters.18 4 Some adjudicators admitted the inade-
quacy of their training; one interpreter reported:
One adjudicator... specifically told me that if he had known
at first what he knew now about the current political condi-
tions in Haiti, he would have screened in many more refugees
during the first few months when he was not aware of this
information. 8 '
Moreover, the INS pressed the interpreters to increase their "pro-
ductivity," setting "quotas" of 2.5 to 3 interviews per hour.8 6
These time allotments, however, included the time necessary to
transport the refugees and to do paperwork; thus many interviews
lasted no more than ten to fifteen minutes.8 7 Of course, as in the
1 Affidavit of Jennie Smith, 16 (Feb 10, 1992), in Haitian Refugee Center, Persecu-
tion of Haitian Returnees & Inadequacy of INS Pre-Screening Procedures Appendix 24
(1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("Smith Affidavit").
"' Affidavit of Stanley Urban, Jr., T 5 (Feb 13, 1992), in Haitian Refugee Center, Perse-
cution of Haitian Returnees at Appendix 25 ("Urban Affidavit").
181 Smith Affidavit, 17 3, 4, 5, 8 and 15; Affidavit of Antoine Eustache, % 4 (Feb 19,
1992), in Haitian Refugee Center, Persecution of Haitian Refugees at Appendix 26 ("Eu-
stache Affidavit"). Smith stated:
A lot of us are wondering whether the Haitians who volunteered to go back to
Haiti were really volunteering or not, because there were so many instances of intimi-
dation and humiliation.
Smith Affidavit at 2 17 (cited in note 179).
182 Smith Affidavit at 1 3, 4, 7 and 8; Eustache Affidavit at % 7.
183 Smith Affidavit at % 10.
184 Id.
185 Eustache Affidavit at 2 16 (cited in note 181).
188 Smith Affidavit at 9 (cited in note 179); Urban Affidavit at 2 3 (cited in note 180).
187 Smith Affidavit at 2 9; Urban Affidavit at 2 3.
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earlier interviews, both questions and answers had to be translated
during this time, so actual interview time was between 5 and 7.5
minutes. Further errors undoubtedly arose because of the exhaus-
tion of the interpreters who worked twelve hours per day, seven
days a week.188
In addition, recordkeeping was sloppy; many records were lost
or poorly kept. 18 9 Throughout this period, the INS apparently
thought the approval rate was too high.190 At one point, the adjudi-
cators barred the interpreters from confirming the accuracy of the
final translation and the adjudicator's notes."9
Thus, the screening process in late December and January,
though a marked improvement over the process in November and
early December, was highly unreliable.
This evidence suggests that the actual process used to screen
Haitians intercepted at sea met the two conditions of the argument
of Part I that lead to an adverse effect on the flow of political refu-
gees. First, the screening process did not discriminate between eco-
nomic and political refugees; individuals of each class were equally
likely to be repatriated.'92 Second, the probability of being repatri-
ated was quite high. In order to determine whether this immigra-
tion policy disproportionately deterred political refugees from emi-
grating, we must evaluate the fate of Haitian emigrants after
repatriation.
4. The persecution of repatriated Haitians.
According to the model outlined in Part I, unreliable screening
of Haitians by the United States will discourage political refugees
more than economic refugees if Haiti's treatment of repatriated
citizens meets two conditions. First, political refugees must face an
increased threat of persecution upon their return. Second, if eco-
nomic refugees are persecuted on their return, the increased risk to
188 Urban Affidavit at 1 11 (cited in note 180); Smith Affidavit, 7 13 (cited in note 179).
," Urban Affidavit at 1 12; Smith Affidavit at T 11 ("There were literally hundreds of
records.., lost by Immigration."); Id at 7 16 ("Every now and then someone would find a
screened in paper misplaced into the screened out pile."). Affidavit of George Vilson, 1 11
(Mar 13, 1992), in Haitian Refugee Center, Persecution of Haitian Returnees at Appendix
27 (cited in note 179) ("Vilson Affidavit").
"'0 Smith Affidavit at % 9; Eustache Affidavit at 1 5, 6 and 8 (cited in note 181); Vilson
Affidavit at 7 2, 5 (cited in note 189).
191 Eustache Affidavit at 1 6.
, Or, at the very least, the screening process appears to have been sufficiently unreli-
able for the arguments of Section I to apply.
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them must be less than the increased risk of persecution to repatri-
ated political refugees.
Unfortunately, the evidence concerning what happens to Hai-
tian emigrants upon their return to Haiti is difficult to interpret.
Their treatment immediately upon arrival is easily characterized,
but what happens after they have returned to their home districts
is less clear. Transportation and communication to areas outside of
Port-au-Prince are difficult and unreliable; and human rights orga-
nizations within Haiti cannot adequately track the repatriated
Haitians.' "3
When repatriates arrive in Port-au-Prince, the United States
turns them over to the Haitian Red Cross, which gives each repa-
triate fifteen dollars in cash and food vouchers.1'9 The Haitian Red
Cross is neither a member of the International Red Cross nor "in-
dependent of government interference and pressure.' 95 A recent
videotape from a hidden camera shows Red Cross workers with
handguns poorly concealed on their persons. 96
In addition to the Haitian Red Cross, repatriates are met by
Haitian immigration officials who interview, fingerprint, and pho-
tograph them.197 Armed police patrol the dock where the repatri-
ates arrive. 198 On at least one occasion, Colonel Monod Phi-
lippe-the head of port security and a prominent figure in the
Duvalier regime-greeted the returnees.19 The heavy presence of
Haitian security forces when the repatriates arrive suggests that
the government seeks to identify its political opponents.
The fate of returnees once they leave the harbor at Port-au-
Prince is less clear. Though the United States denies that any of
these returnees have been persecuted, strong evidence contradicts
this optimistic view. Repatriated Haitians face persecution on their
return; whether the victims are persecuted simply because of their
193 Michael Tarr, No One Knows What Happens to Refugees, Haiti Rights Groups
Say, Reuter Library Rep 1 (Feb 12, 1992).
194 Lee Hockstader, Cutters Return First 381 of Fleeing Haitians, Wash Post All (Feb
4, 1992). The State Department Briefing of February 7, 1992, describes the assistance as "a
small cash grant to assist with transport home." Richard Boucher, State Dept Briefing, Feb
7, 1991 (Fed News Serv), available on NEXIS (EXEC library, DSTATE file).
195 Baker, 789 F Supp at 1577 (cited in note 148).
196 Eustache Affidavit at 5 14 (cited in note 181). Vilson Affidavit at 1 6 (cited in note
189).
197 Howard W. French, Some Haitians Say Continuing Abuses Forced a Second Flight,
NY Times Al, A8 (Feb 10, 1992).
198 Id.
199 Greg Chamberlain, Duvalier's Man on the Quayside, Manchester Guardian Wkly 1
.(Feb 9, 1992).
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status as repatriates or because they are also political opponents of
the regime is more difficult to determine.
The evidence for persecution of the earliest emigrants is
strongest. At least seventy-six repatriated Haitians have fled a sec-
ond time.200 Forty-one of these individuals fled the second time as
a group and were interdicted (the second time) prior to February
12, 1992.01 They were then temporarily paroled into the United
States because the INS believed they had a credible claim.20 2
In interviews with officials from the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, each of these individuals claimed to
have been persecuted on his return.23 They stated that they and
other returnees were victims of persecution ranging from arbitrary
arrest to torture to killings. 04 Newspaper reports have discussed a
few of these cases in more detail.
One refugee, Simulus Thomas, reported that, two days after
his return, soldiers sought him at his mother's house but left when
told that he was not there.20 5 Mr. Thomas had initially fled Haiti
after his father, active in the Aristide political movement Lavalas,
had been shot.20 6 Mr. Thomas was later arrested and imprisoned
but managed to escape.20 7 Other returnees in his cell had been
beaten.208
'" Howard W. French, U.N. Finds Haitians Who Fled Anew, NY Times A3 (Feb 16,
1992). We have no information concerning the INS treatment of the thirty-five other Hai-
tians who have been interdicted twice. They did not arrive together and they come from
different parts of Haiti. Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Kenneth Roth, Haiti: The Shadow of Terror, NY Rev Books 62, 64 (Mar 26, 1992).
See also Simon Tisdall, Repatriated Haitians "Persecuted," Manchester Guardian Wkly 1
(Feb 16, 1992). A published summary of 17 of the UNHCR interviews catalogues the abuses.
U.S. Committee for Refugees, Haitian Repatriates: A Well-Founded Fear?, 13 Refugee Rep
2-5 (Feb 28, 1992).
204 Telephone interview with Julian Fleet of UNHCR, D.C. office. ("Fleet
Conversation").
Though the United States denies that any of the repatriated Haitians have been perse-
cuted, id, the extent and quality of its investigations are open to criticism. The United
States claims to have investigated in detail four of the forty-one claims and found no cor-
roborating evidence. Id. It also claims to have investigated 700 other cases, id, though it has
not, to our knowledge, released any details of these investigations.
Our argument in Section I suggests that Haiti was more likely to persecute those re-
turned in November than those returned in February because the later returnees would
likely have included a lower proportion of political refugees. See notes 48-50 and accompa-
nying text.
205 French, NY Times at A8 (Feb 10, 1992) (cited in note 197).
206 Id.
207 Id.
2o Id.
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Some of these returnees have alleged that they were perse-
cuted solely on the basis of their status as returnees, but not all of
them make this allegation. °0 An examination of the publicly avail-
able summaries and newspaper reports suggests that each of them
has asserted claims that would sustain a well-founded fear of per-
secution at the time he or she first left Haiti.
Of seventeen brief summaries of interviews with these return-
ees published in a human rights newsletter, four give clear indica-
tions that their persecution resulted from a combination of their
political affiliations and their status as returnees. For example, one
summary relates that two days after a repatriate identified as
"Pierre" returned to his home in Haiti:
Soldiers barraged his house with bullets, killing Pierre's father
within. When the soldiers had arrived, Pierre and his wife had
been behind the house and they hid in the brush. After the
rampage, a neighbor informed Pierre that, as they were leav-
ing, the soldiers proclaimed that they had come to kill the
FNCD delegate who had been returned.210
One woman, designated "Michelle" in the summary, returned
home only to be beaten and arrested by a judge and then incarcer-
ated for a week:
The military guards in the prison told Michelle that she
would be killed because she had been a member of the FNCD
and because she had left Haiti. While in prison, Michelle was
beaten by the guards. After one week, she was released from
prison, without explanation.21'
When a third repatriate ("Joseph") reached his home in Haiti:
[H]e found that his father and sister had been arrested. Ac-
cording to one of his friends who had witnessed the arrest
from afar, Joseph's family had been arrested due to the fact
that they were family members of a known Lavalas supporter
and repatriate. 12
209 Fleet Conversation (cited in note 204).
210 U.S. Committee for Refugees, 13 Refugee Rep at 2 (Case 2)(cited in note 203).
"FNCD" stands for the "Front National pour Changement et Democratie" (National Front
for Change and Democracy), a coalition of political parties that favored the 1990 elections
and on whose platform and backing Aristide ran for President. Lee Hochstader, Haitian
Names Ally to Post: Some Fear Narrow Role, Wash Post A16 (Feb 10, 1991).
211 13 Refugee Rep at 2 (Case 3).
212 Id at 3 (Case 5). "Lavalas" is the name of the popular movement supporting Aris-
tide. Hochstader, Wash Post at A16 (Feb 10, 1991) (cited in note 210).
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A fourth individual ("Henri"):
[learned from] close friends that the military was searching
for 17 persons in his neighborhood who were targeted as Aris-
tide supporters and as repatriates. . . . Three days later,
soldiers in a white car came to Henri's house to arrest him.
Henri escaped from his house through a back window.21 3
This evidence supports the claim that political refugees face a
greater increase in the risk of persecution on return than economic
refugees do. Several of the reports indicate that victims are chosen
not only because they were repatriated but also because of their
political affiliations. Furthermore, virtually all those interviewed
also assert their political connections to Aristide. Though not all of
these individuals claim that they were persecuted because of their
political connections, we should not draw negative conclusions
from this. The interviews presumably sought to determine whether
the returnees were persecuted without regard to the motives of the
persecutors.
CONCLUSION
Since the overthrow of Haiti's democratically elected Presi-
dent on September 30, 1991, many Haitians have fled their coun-
try. The United States has intercepted these emigrants at sea.
Early groups of emigrants were granted cursory interviews, after
which the United States forcibly returned the overwhelming ma-
jority to Haiti. Recent emigrants receive even more summary treat-
ment; the United States returns them to Haiti without any inquiry
into claims of political persecution.
The United States justifies these actions by claiming that, de-
spite the high level of political persecution in Haiti, the vast ma-
jority of Haitian emigrants are economic, not political, refugees.
Given the inadequacy of early screening procedures, and the cur-
rent total absence of any screening procedures, it is difficult to as-
sess directly the validity of the U.S. government's claim. Moreover,
a proper evaluation of U.S. policy involves a subtlety which goes
beyond a reliable survey of recent emigrants. Neither the actual
number nor the actual proportion of current political refugees indi-
cates anything about the number of potential political refugees
who would have sought asylum had the U.S. screening procedures
213 Id at 4 (Case 14).
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offered better chance that genuine political refugees would be
identified and granted asylum.
Nonetheless, there would be no harm in applying a little com-
mon sense when evaluating the Haitian situation. Immediately
prior to the September coup, despite economic hardship, fewer
than 200 Haitians per month sought refuge. Immediately after the
coup this number jumped to over 3,000 per month (with 6,000
emigrants in November and again in January). In this time the
economic conditions of Haiti's poor probably changed little. Al-
though the Uniteff States imposed sanctions against Haiti, initially
these sanctions simply deprived the regime of weapons and access
to Haiti's assets in the United States. A full commercial embargo
was not announced until October 28, and it did not take effect un-
til November 5.214
Prior to the coup there was virtually no political violence or
persecution. After the coup, the military regime systematically at-
tacked neighborhoods and organizations that had supported Aris-
tide's ousted government. Many leaders and activists in these
neighborhoods and organizations, have been arrested and tortured,
or killed.
Though their economic condition may have changed little af-
ter the coup, a large number of Haitians chose to face significant
perils at sea to reach the United States. Perhaps they chose to emi-
grate on a whim. More likely, the perils at home outweighed the
perils at sea. Unfortunately, these refugees did not accurately
weigh the dangers of U.S. immigration policy. They have been re-
turned to the military regime from whose violence they fled.
214 See note 146.
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